Subprime Mortgag: Mortgage made out to borrowers with low credit.

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SUBPRIME MORTGAGE

The Fuel That Fed The Subprime Meltdown

Dozens of mortgage lenders declare bankruptcy in a matter of weeks. The market is filled with
concerns of a major global credit crunch, which could affect all classes of borrowers. Central
banks use emergency clauses to inject liquidity into scared financial markets. The real estate
markets plummet after years of record highs. Foreclosure rates double year-over-year during the
latter half of 2006 and in 2007.

The reports sound intimidating, but what does all this mean?

We are currently knee-deep in a financial crisis that centers on the U.S. housing market, where
fallout from the frozen subprime mortgage market is spilling over into the credit markets, as well
as domestic and global stock markets. Read on to learn more about how the markets fell this
far, and what may lie ahead.

The Path to a Crisis
Was this the case of one group or one company falling asleep at the wheel? Is this the result of
too little oversight, too much greed, or simply not enough understanding? As is often the case
when financial markets go awry, the answer is likely "all the above"

Remember, the market we are watching today is a byproduct of the market of six years ago.
Rewind back to late 2001, when fear of global terror attacks after Sept. 11 roiled an already-
struggling economy, one that was just beginning to come out of the recession induced by the
tech bubble of the late 1990s.

In response, during 2001, the Federal Reserve began cutting rates dramatically, and the fed
funds rate arrived at 1% in 2003, which in central banking parlance is essentially zero. The
goal of a low federal funds rate is to expand the money supply and encourage borrowing,
which should spur spending and investing. The idea that spending was "patriotic" was widely
propagated and everyone - from the White House down to the local parent-teacher association
- encouraged us to buy, buy, buy.

It worked, and the economy began to steadily expand in 2002.

Real Estate Begins to Look Attractive
As lower interest rates worked their way into the economy, the real estate market began to work
itself into a frenzy as the number of homes sold - and the prices they sold for - increased
dramatically beginning in 2002. At the time, the rate on a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage was at
the lowest levels seen in nearly 40 years, and people saw a unique opportunity to gain access
into just about cheapest source of equity available.

Investment Banks, and the Asset-Backed Security
If the housing market had only been dealt a decent hand - say, one with low interest rates and
rising demand - any problems would have been fairly contained. Unfortunately, it was dealt a
fantastic hand, thanks to new financial products being spun on Wall Street. These new
products ended up being spread far and wide and were included in pension funds, hedge
funds and international governments.

And, as we're now learning, many of these products ended up being worth
absolutely nothing.

A Simple Idea Leads to Big Problems
The asset-backed security (ABS) has been around for decades, and at its core lies a simple
investment principle: Take a bunch of assets that have predictable and similar cash flows (like
an individual's home mortgage), bundle them into one managed package that collects all of
the individual payments (the mortgage payments), and use the money to pay investors a
coupon on the managed package. This creates an asset-backed security in which the
underlying real estate acts as collateral. (For more insight, read Asset Allocation With Fixed
Income.)

Another big plus was that credit rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's would
put their 'AAA' or 'A+' stamp of approval on many of these securities, signaling their relative
safety as an investment.

The advantage for the investor is that he or she can acquire a diversified portfolio of fixed-
income assets that arrive as one coupon payment.

The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) had been bundling and selling
securitized mortgages as ABSs for years; their 'AAA' ratings had always had the guarantee that
Ginnie Mae's government backing had afforded . Investors gained a higher yield than on
Treasuries, and Ginnie Mae was able to use the funding to offer new mortgages.

Widening the Margins
Thanks to an exploding real estate market, an updated form of the ABS was also being
created, only these ABSs were being stuffed with subprime mortgage loans, or loans to buyers
with less-than-stellar credit. (To learn more about subprime, read Subprime Is Often Subpar
and Subprime Lending: Helping Hand Or Underhanded?)

Subprime loans, along with their much higher default risks, were placed into different risk
classes, or tranches, each of which came with its own repayment schedule. Upper tranches
were able to receive 'AAA' ratings - even if they contained subprime loans - because these
tranches were promised the first dollars that came into the security. Lower tranches carried
higher coupon rates to compensate for the increased default risk. All the way at the bottom, the
"equity" tranche was a highly speculative investment, as it could have its cash flows essentially
wiped out if the default rate on the entire ABS crept above a low level - in the range of 5 to 7%.

All of a sudden, even the subprime mortgage lenders had an avenue to sell their risky debt,
which in turn enabled them to market this debt even more aggressively. Wall Street was there
to pick up their subprime loans, package them up with other loans (some quality, some not),
and sell them off to investors. In addition, nearly 80% of these bundled securities magically
became investment grade ('A' rated or higher), thanks to the rating agencies, which earned
lucrative fees for their work in rating the ABSs.

As a result of this activity, it became very profitable to originate mortgages - even risky ones. It
wasn't long before even basic requirements like proof of income and a down payment were
being overlooked by mortgage lenders; 125% loan-to-value mortgages were being underwritten
and given to prospective homeowners. The logic being that with real estate prices rising so fast
(median home prices were rising as much as 14% annually by 2005), a 125% LTV mortgage
would be above water in less than two years.

Leverage Squared
The reinforcing loop was starting to spin too quickly, but with Wall Street, Main Street and
everyone in between profiting from the ride, who was going to put on the brakes?

Record-low interest rates had combined with ever-loosening lending standards to push real
estate prices to record highs across most of the United States. Existing homeowners were
refinancing in record numbers, tapping into recently earned equity that could be had with a
few hundred dollars spent on a home appraisal.

Meanwhile, thanks to the liquidity in the market, investment banks and other large investors
were able to borrow more and more (increased leverage) to create additional investment
products, which included shaky subprime assets.

Collateralized Debt Joins the Fray
The ability to borrow more prompted banks and other large investors to create collateralized
debt obligations (CDO), which essentially scooped up equity and "mezzanine" (medium-to-low
rated) tranches from MBSs and repackaged them yet again, this time into mezzanine CDOs.

By using the same "trickle down" payment scheme, most of the mezzanine CDOs could garner
an 'AAA' credit rating, landing it in the hands of hedge funds, pension funds, commercial
banks and other institutional investors.

Residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), in which cash flows come from residential
debt, and CDOs were effectively removing the lines of communication between the borrower
and the original lender. Suddenly, large investors controlled the collateral; as a result,
negotiations over late mortgage payments were bypassed for the "direct-to-foreclosure" model
of an investor looking to cut his losses.

However, these factors would not have caused the current crisis if 1) the real estate market
continued to boom and 2) homeowners could actually pay their mortgages. However, because
this did not occur, these factors only helped to fuel the number of foreclosures later on.

Teaser Rates and the ARM
With mortgage lenders exporting much of the risk in subprime lending out the door to investors,
they were free to come up with interesting strategies to originate loans with their freed up
capital. By using teaser rates (special low rates that would last for the first year or two of a
mortgage) within adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), borrowers could be enticed into an initially
affordable mortgage in which payments would skyrocket in three, five, or seven years. As the
real estate market pushed to its peaks in 2005 and 2006, teaser rates, ARMs, and the "interest-
only" loan (where no principle payments are made for the first few years) were increasingly
pushed upon homeowners. As these loans became more common, fewer borrowers questioned
the terms and were instead enticed by the prospect of being able to refinance in a few years
(at a huge profit, the argument stated), enabling them to make whatever catch-up payments
would be necessary. What borrowers didn't take into account in the booming housing market,
however, was that any decrease in home value would leave the borrower with an untenable
combination of a balloon payment and a much higher mortgage payment.

A market as close to home as real estate becomes impossible to ignore when it's firing on all
cylinders. Over the space of five years, home prices in many areas had literally doubled, and
just about anyone who hadn't purchased a home or refinanced considered themselves behind
in the race to make money in that market. Mortgage lenders knew this, and pushed ever-more
aggressively. New homes couldn't be built fast enough, and homebuilders' stocks soared.

The CDO market (secured mainly with subprime debt) ballooned to more than $600 billion in
issuance during 2006 alone - more than 10-times the amount issued just a decade earlier.
These securities, although illiquid, were picked up eagerly in the secondary markets, which
happily parked them into large institutional funds at their market-beating interest rates.

Subprime

A classification of borrowers with a tarnished or limited credit history. Lenders will use a credit scoring system to determine which loans a
borrower may qualify for. Subprime loans carry more credit risk, and as such, will carry higher interest rates as well. Approximately 25% of
mortgage originations are classified as Subprime , Occasionally some borrowers might be classified as subprime despite having
a good credit history. The reason for this is because the borrowers has elected to not provide verification of income or assets in the loan
application process.

The loans in this classification are called stated income and/or stated asset (SISA) loans or even no income/no asset (NINA) loans.

Subprime Lender
A type of lender that specializes in lending to borrowers with a tainted or limited credit history. Subprime lending is more concentrated in a
smaller number of large lenders than prime lending. The subprime loan market is more tiered compared to the prime loan market, where
terms and rates vary little between borrowers.

Subprime lenders use a risk-based pricing system to calculate the terms of loans, including the interest rate, which they offer to borrowers
with varying credit histories. The securities issued by subprime lenders tend to carry more credit risk but less interest rate risk than securities
backed by prime loans. This is because subprime borrowers tend to have a shorter time horizon and fewer opportunities to refinance when
interest rates fall.

Subprime Mortgage
A type of mortgage that is normally made out to borrowers with lower credit ratings. As a result of the borrower's lowered credit rating, a
conventional mortgage is not offered because the lender views the borrower as having a larger-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan.
Lending institutions often charge interest on subprime mortgages at a rate that is higher than a conventional mortgage in order to compensate
themselves for carrying more risk.

Borrowers with credit ratings below 600 often will be stuck with subprime mortgages and the higher interest rates that go with those
mortgages. Making late bill payments or declaring personal bankruptcy could very well land borrowers in a situation where they can only qualify
for a subprime mortgage. Therefore, it is often useful for people with low credit scores to wait for a period of time and build up their scores
before applying for mortgages to ensure they are eligible for a conventional mortgage.

What is a subprime mortgage?

A subprime mortgage is a type of loan granted to individuals with poor credit histories (often below 600), who, as a result of their deficient
credit ratings, would not be able to qualify for conventional mortgages. Because subprime borrowers present a higher risk for lenders,
subprime mortgages charge interest rates above the prime lending rate.

There are several different kinds of subprime mortgage structures available. The most common is the adjustable rate mortgage (ARM),
which initially charges a fixed interest rate, and then convert to a floating rate based on an index such as LIBOR, plus a margin. The better
known types of ARMs include 3/27 and 2/28 ARMs.

ARMs are somewhat misleading to subprime borrowers in that the borrowers initially pay a lower interest rate. When their mortgages
reset to the higher, variable rate, mortgage payments increase significantly. This is one of the factors that lead to the sharp increase in
the number of subprime mortgage foreclosures in August of 2006, and the subprime mortgage meltdown that ensued.

Many lenders were more liberal in granting these loans from 2004 to 2006 as a result of lower interest rates and high capital liquidity.
Lenders sought additional profits through these higher risk loans, and they charged interest rates above prime in order to compensate
for the additional risk they assumed. Consequently, once the rate of subprime mortgage foreclosures skyrocketed, many lenders
experienced extreme financial difficulties, and even bankruptcy.

Cracks Begin to Appear

However, by the middle of 2006, cracks began to appear. New homes sales stalled, and
median sale prices halted their climb. Interest rates - while still low historically - were on the
rise, with inflation fears threatening to raise them higher. All of the easy-to-underwrite
mortgages and refinances had already been done, and the first of the shaky ARMs, written
12 to 24 months earlier, were beginning to reset.

Default rates began to rise sharply. Suddenly, the CDO didn't look so attractive to investors
in search of yield. After all, many of the CDOs had been re-packaged so many times that it
was difficult to tell how much subprime exposure was actually in them.

The Crunch of Easy Credit
It wasn't long before news of problems in the sector went from boardroom discussions to
headline-grabbing news.

Scores of mortgage lenders -with no more eager secondary markets or investment banks to
sell their loans into - were cut off from what had become a main funding source and were
forced to shut down operations. As a result, CDOs went from illiquid to unmarketable.

In the face of all this financial uncertainty, investors became much more risk averse, and
looked to unwind positions in potentially hazardous MBSs, and any fixed-income security
not paying a proper risk premium for the perceived level of risk. Investors were casting their
votes en masse that subprime risks were not ones worth taking.

Amid this flight to quality, three-month Treasury bills became the new "must-have" fixed-
income product and yields fell a shocking 1.5% in a matter of days. Even more notable
than the buying of government-backed bonds (and short-term ones at that) was the spread
between similar-term corporate bonds and T-bills, which widened from about 35 basis
points to more than 120 basis points in less than a week.

These changes may sound minimal or undamaging to the untrained eye, but in the modern
fixed-income markets - where leverage is king and cheap credit is only the current jester - a
move of that magnitude can do a lot of damage. This was illustrated by the collapse of
several hedge funds.

Many institutional funds were faced with margin and collateral calls from nervous banks,
which forced them to sell other assets, such as stocks and bonds, to raise cash. The
increased selling pressure took hold of the stock markets, as major equity averages
worldwide were hit with sharp declines in a matter of weeks, which effectively stalled the
strong market that had taken the Dow Jones Industrial Average to all-time highs in July of
2007.

To help stem the impact of the crunch, the central banks of the U.S., Japan and Europe,
through cash injections of several hundred billion dollars, helped banks with their liquidity
issues and helped to stabilize the financial markets. The Federal Reserve also cut the
discount window rate, which made it cheaper for financial institutions to borrow funds from
the Fed, add liquidity to their operations and help struggling assets.

The added liquidity helped to stabilize the market to a degree but the full impact of these
events is not yet clear.

Conclusion
There is nothing inherently wrong or bad about the collateralized debt obligation or any of
its financial relatives. It is a natural and intelligent way to diversify risk and open up capital
markets. Like anything else - the dotcom bubble, Long-Term Capital Management's
collapse, and the hyperinflation of the early 1980s - if a strategy or instrument is misused or
overcooked, there will need to be a good shaking-out of the arena. Call it a natural
extension of capitalism, where greed can inspire innovation, but if unchecked, major
market forces are required to bring balance back to the system.

What's Next?
So where do we go from here? The answer to this question will center on finding out just
how far-reaching the impact will be, both in the United States and around the world. The
best situation for all parties involved remains one in which the U.S. economy does well,
unemployment stays low, personal income keeps pace with inflation and real estate prices
find a bottom. Only when the last part happens will we be able to assess the total impact of
the subprime meltdown.

Regulatory oversight is bound to get stiffer after this fiasco, probably keeping lending
restrictions and bond ratings very conservative for the next few years. Any lessons learned
aside, Wall Street will continue to seek new ways to price risk and package securities, and it
remains the duty of the investor to see the future through the valuable filters of the past.

with inflation and real estate prices find a bottom. Only when the last part happens will we
be able to assess the total impact of the subprime meltdown.

Regulatory oversight is bound to get stiffer after this fiasco, probably keeping lending
restrictions and bond ratings very conservative for the next few years. Any lessons learned
aside, Wall Street will continue to seek new ways to price risk and package securities, and it
remains the duty of the investor to see the future through the valuable filters of the past.

Subprime Lending: Helping Hand Or Underhanded?

Subprime is a classification of loans offered at rates greater than the prime rate to
individuals who are unable qualify for prime rate loans. This usually occurs when borrowers
have poor credit and, as a result, the lender views them as higher risk.

Loan qualification is based on a number of factors including income, assets and credit
rating. In most cases, subprime borrowers have questions marks surrounding them in one or
more of these areas, such as a poor credit rating or an inability to prove income. For
example, someone with a credit rating below 620 or with no assets will likely not qualify for
a traditional mortgage and will need to resort to a subprime loan to gain the necessary
financing. Read on to learn more about this type of lending and how it got its bad
reputation.

Subprime Vs. Prime
In addition to having higher interest rates than prime-rate loans, subprime loans often come
with higher fees. And, unlike prime-rate loans, which are quite similar from lender to lender,
subprime loans vary greatly. A process known as risk-based pricing is used to calculate
mortgage rates and terms - the worse your credit, the more expensive the loan.

Subprime loans are usually used to finance mortgages. They often include prepayment
penalties that do not allow borrowers to pay off the loan early, making it difficult and
expensive to refinance or retire the loan prior to the end of its term. Some of these loans
also come with balloon maturities, which require a large final payment. Still others come
with artificially low introductory rates that ratchet upward substantially, increasing the
monthly payment by as much as 50%.

Borrowers often do not realize that a loan is subprime because lenders rarely use that
terminology. From a marketing perspective, "subprime" is not an attractive term. (To learn
more, read Subprime Is Often Subpar.)

History
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and later liberalization of regulations gave
lenders strong incentive to loan money to low-income borrowers. The Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 enabled lenders to charge higher interest rates to borrowers
with low credit scores. Then, the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, passed in
1982, enabled the use of variable-rate loans and balloon payments. Finally, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the interest deduction for consumer loans, but kept the
mortgage interest deduction. These acts set the onslaught of subprime lending in motion.

Over time, businesses adapted to this changing environment, and subprime lending
expansion began in earnest. While subprime loans are available for a variety of purchases,
mortgages are the big-ticket items for most consumers, so an increase in subprime lending
naturally gravitated toward the mortgage market. According to statistics released by the
Federal Reserve Board in 2004, from 1994 to 2003, subprime lending increased at a rate of
25% per year, making it the fastest growing segment of the U.S. mortgage industry.
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Board cites the growth as a "nearly ten-fold increase in
just nine years."

The Good
Subprime loans have increased the opportunities for homeownership, adding nine million
households to the ranks of homeowners in less than a decade and catapulting the United
States into the top tier of developed countries on homeownership rates, on par with the
United Kingdom and slightly behind Spain, Finland, Ireland and Australia, according to the
Federal Reserve. More than half of those added to the ranks of new homeowners are
minorities. Because home equity is the primary savings vehicle for a significant percentage
of the population, home ownership is a good way to build wealth.

The Bad
Subprime loans are expensive. They have higher interest rates and are often accompanied
by prepayment and other penalties. Adjustable-rate loans are of particular concern, as the
payments can jump dramatically when interest rates rise. (To learn more about adjustable
rates loans, see Mortgages: Fixed-Rate Versus Adjustable-Rate and American Dream Or
Mortgage Nightmare?) All too often, subprime loans are made to people who have no other
way to access funds and little understanding of the mechanics of the loan.

On the lending side, the rush to bring in new business can lead to sloppy business practices,
such as giving out loans without requiring borrowers to provide documented proof of
income and without regard to what will happen if interest rates rise.

The Ugly
Because subprime borrowers generally aren't favorable candidates for more traditional
loans, subprime loans tend to have significantly higher default rates than prime-rate loans.
When interest rates rise rapidly and housing values stagnate or fall, the ripple effects are felt
across the entire industry.

The borrowers' inability to meet their payments or to refinance (due to prepayment
penalties) causes borrowers to default. As foreclosure rates rise, lenders fail. Ultimately, the
investors that purchased mortgage-backed securities based on subprime loans also get hurt
when the underlying loans default.

Buyer Beware
When used responsibly by lenders, subprime loans can provide purchasing power to
individuals who might not otherwise have access to funds. While negative attention is often
focused on the mortgage industry, particularly on subprime lenders, the borrowers
themselves share some responsibility for the problems subprimes have caused in the market.
In other words, borrowers should never sign papers for a loan they do not understand or have
the ability to repay. Despite the fact that a significant segment of subprime borrowers
default on their loans, the loans themselves are neither good nor evil. They are simply an
economic tool.

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Subprime Mortgage
A type of mortgage that is normally made out to borrowers with lower credit ratings. As a result of the borrower's lowered credit rating, a conventional mortgage is not offered because the
lender views the borrower as having a larger-than-average risk of defaulting on the loan.

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